Singapore's Election Watch

Categories: Singapore

The battle lines had been drawn on the 27 April. This was the Nomination Day for the 9th Singapore post-independence election, scheduled 6 May. Politicians from the governing party, Peoples Action Party (PAP) and the opposition will vie for 84 parlimentary seats with 9 Single Member Constituencies (SMCs) and 14 Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs).

This time round, the ruling PAP government fails to form the government on Nomination Day unlike in past years. Since 1988, the ruling PAP had been returned to power on Nomination Day itself. This time round, the failure, is not so much the failure of PAP itself but due to the change in the opposition's election strategy. With the voting in of Mr Chiam See Tong in 1984, the de-facto opposition "leader", he introduced a "by-election" strategy whereby the opposition "allows" the PAP to form the government on Nomination Day and fight for the rest of the seats. Their reasoning behind this was to reassure the people into voting for the oppositions since the ruling PAP with its good track record had already formed the government. This strategy worked, for in 1991, 4 opposition including incumbant Mr Chiam were elected into parliment - the highest ever, since independence. However with the expulsion of Mr Chiam from his party, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), come the next general election in 1997, the PAP managed to wrestle back two seats leaving only 2 oppositions. Since then, the electorial votes for the opposition had dwindled and a new strategy had to be thought up. Therefore in this coming general election, the political landscape has changed.

The ruling PAP with its excellent track record is contesting all 84 seats. After the Nomination Day, they had 37 seats from walk-over. This is not surprising given that they usually won seats through walk-over on Nomination Day itself. However no one doubts that the PAP will form the next government again; after all they had been in power since independence. In a country where election results are so predictable the gauge for popular support is based on the percentage of votes casts. This is possible because election in Singapore is compulsory. Previous years, PAP generally gets above 70% of the votes; therefore anything less than this is considered loss of support.

This time round, the Prime Minister who has never fought an election since becoming the Deputy PM in 1991, will have to defend his GRC seat in Ang Mo Kio. He fought his first two terms in 1984 and 1988. There is little doubt that he will win, a fact even acknowledged by his opponents from Workers Party (WP).

Two contested GRCs to watch will be Sembawang GRC which will see PAP squaring off with the SDP and that of Aljunied GRC between PAP and WP.

In Sembawang GRC, PAP is helmed by a young minister, Mr Khaw who as the Health Minister had proven himself during SARS crisis and the NKF debacle. His was a fast track promotion as he was only elected into Parliment in 2001. This will be his first time facing the voters as he "walked" into Parliment by walkover when he was in Minister Mentor's Lee Kuan Yew GRC team.

Aljunied GRC will see the incumbant PAP team facing the most promising WP team. How important is this challenge by the WP is reflected by the PM himself opening the election rally speech last night.

As for the SMC, the ward to follow is that of Choa Chu Kang. This ward will see a straight fight between Mr Steve Chia of Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) and Mr Gan Kim Yong, the Minister of State, Education and Manpower. Mr Steve Chia was previously praised by the now Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong as having good potential in the last general election. Mr Steve Chia has been with Choa Chu Kang since the last election whereas Mr Gan only appeared in the ward about two months ago. Therefore in this ward, the electorate will probably have to choose between a candidate against a party.


The SDA is a coalition of few opposition party. It was formed in 2001. Its most prominent member is the veteran Mr Chiam who had been a MP since 1984. Mr Chiam will probably win his seat in Potong Pasir, although this may be a close call. He last won the seat by just 700 votes. As an incumbant he has slight advantage against the same PAP candidate he defeated last election. This time round, the PAP has brought in Senior Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong to help in campaigning. It would be interesting to see if the electorate will vote for a candidate who has difficulty conducting his own campaigning. It must also be remembered that Mr Chiam had defeated a PAP candidate before who is now a minister by 4000 votes.

Another potential hot seat contested by SDA is in Choa Chu Kang between Steve Chia and Gan Kim Yong. Mr Steve Chia seemed quite promising in Parliament although SM Goh think otherwise. However Mr Steve Chia's brushes with the law and his own idiosyncracies may work against him. The outcome should be a closed one.

The WP has put up some credible team in this election. Its incumbant is its chief Mr Low in Hougang. He would most likely retain his seat, probably more likely than his counterpart in Potong Pasir. His opponent is Mr Eric Low the candidate he had defeated in the last election. Again SM Goh is tasked to help in his campaigning.

WP put up its most credible team in Aljunied GRC. This team comprises of professionals, the very same type of candidates that PAP looked for. They are expected to give a good fight to the PAP's team of 5 including the Foreign Minister George Yeo and two Ministers-of-State. Though they are most likely to loose, it will be interesting how well they are able to carry out their political rally. Their reputation unfortunately is marred by one of its candidates dispute with the Election Commision regarding his application for minority certification. He has since admitted to his oversight.

The surprise GRC that WP is contesting must be that of Ang Mo Kio GRC, the Prime Minister's ward. According to the WP chief, this is a branding exercise, to show to the people that WP is a serious party. They also commented that it does not look good to have a walk-over PM. When asked if he is sending in martyr, he said: "I think a '敢死队' (a team who dare to die) is better than a '怕死队' (a team that is afraid to die)". This team is expected to lose but what elections watcher wants to see is how much of popular vote PM Lee's team will win. PM Lee is not as popular as the former PM Goh (now SM) because his father happens to be Mr Lee Kuan Yew. If there is a dip in the support for PM Lee, this may rattle the PAP's leadership and the number opposition's vote can be viewed as protest votes.

The SDP is fighting in one SMC and one GRC. They are not expected to do well in both constituencies. This is because of internal squabbling after the party's CEC was sued by MM Lee and PM Lee after the party printed a defamatory article against them. Half of the CEC members had already apologised with the remaining fighting out the court case. Even Mr Ling How Dong, who will be fighting in the SMC ward has contradicted himself regarding the status of Dr Chee Soo Juan, the party's Secretary General, who is largely blamed for the present court case. Dr Chee is barred from this election because he was made a bankrupt after losing another court battle involving defamation against the PAP leaders.

It will be interesting to see how well the opposition is faring with the change in election strategy. It will also be interesting to see how the PAP's mostly professionals, and high flying successful men and women fare against the mostly heartlanders of the opposition. Maybe this will be a true battle line rather than an artificial one separating the pre from the post-65s.

Links:
General Election 2006 Election Map
The Election Battleground
Wikipedia - 15th Singapore General Election

Is the high fuel cost necessarily bad?

Categories: Wormie Says

The price of oil has been steadily going up since last year. Currently the price of a barrel of oil stands at US$70. Is the high price of oil necessarily bad?

On the people level, high prices of oil create hardships. This is because everything is tied to oil, either directly or indirectly. Oil is the main source of energy for much of the industry. Oil is needed for transport, for generating power, generating heat, powering electricity among others. Therefore it is easy to see why high oil prices means higher prices for nearly all consumable goods.

However if we look at the bigger picture, high oil prices may be a blessing in disguise. For years, oil has been the main source of fuel that drive our industries. Nuclear energy was introduced in the sixties but because of public outcry regarding the safety and its waste products; coupled with accidents like those that occurs in Long Island, New York and Chernobyl, no nuclear plants were built for the last decade. Other forms of energy sources like solar energy and wind energy, are experimental at best. Expert has estimated that the world's oil reserve can only last for about 50 years. This means that in half a decade, the world will run out of its main energy source unless alternatives are found. For years, scientists have worked on these alternatives sources but has limited success partly due to the limited funding and partly because of the high cost of alternatives energy sources compared to the price of oil. Imagine what would happen to the world's industries, if oil prices continues to be cheap with the threat of the oil wells drying up? Overnight the industries would grind to a halt, much hardship will ensue and life as we know it will never be the same again. Therefore, the high oil prices serves as a catalyst to speed up the research into alternative energy and also to enable the scientists to relook at other alternatives which were deemed too expensive to produce. In this way, old technology can be improved to further reduce the cost and increase on the efficiency to the extend that such technology becomes viable at today's oil prices.

A good example is oil from oil sand. In 1979 it cost C$25 dollars to produce a barrel of oil. However this has dropped to C$13 in 1998. Because the price of fossil oil cost around US$30 in 1979 and about US$40 in 1998. Therefore it can be seen that once a costly production production process has become cheaper and at the same time. Even if the production cost had remained the same, this has become viable just because the cost of fossil fuel has increased twofold.

On the people level too, the high price of fossil oil may serve as a warning and hopefully change the way people live their normal lives. Currently, we have been using technologies that essentially guzzle up energy. All this is done in the name of progress. We now have super skyscrappers, convention halls and megamalls which needed ever bigger air-conditionings. We build bigger and more powerful cars that literally drinks petrol. All this is done without much thought to either the oil reserves or the environment. The problem of oil reserves or the global warming seemed so distant and therefore out of the radar screen for most people. However with the skyrocketing price of oil, things have changed, because now it hits where it matters most - the pocket. No amount of education and common sense can be more efficient than hitting the pocket in attempting to change people's habits. Now people gets to experience what it might be like in 50 years time when, because of the dwindling oil reserves and without alternative energies, the price of fossil fuel would most probably surpass the current record prices. People at that time will have to be prudent in their daily lives. The use of air-conditioning would be curtailed, private transport slowly replaced by public transport, use of smaller and more fuel efficient cars, alternative forms of transport, etc. It would be very difficult to suddenly change our way of lives in a short time but if we start to change now, maybe when the time comes, maybe life would not be so unbearable.

So is the rising cost of oil neccessarily bad? It may not be. In the short run, yes! But in the long run, it will act as a catalyst and an 'encouragement' for the scientists to come out with alternatives source of energy or to relook at previous technologies for their viability.

The Scenic Bridge - Wormie says

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

It is good that Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has instructed Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi, ambassador-at-large in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to explain to Malaysians why the government had scrapped the bridge project. This can be seen as a response to a scanting attack by the former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir through an open letter dated 19 April. After reading and trying to understand both transcripts, I have come to the following conclusions. I will based my views on the points brought up by Tun Dr Mahathir in his open letter.

1. Tun charged that "Singapore likes to publish correspondence between its leaders with Malaysian leaders with the intention of proving that it is on the side of truth." He raised the questions of legality of oral agreements and press conference statements that was not endorsed and agreed by the both parties. He gave as an example a letter (Appendix 1) written by the then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to Tun Daim dated 24 August 2000. However he strangely also quoted from the same letter which SM Lee wrote:

"... To make it easier for us to write to each other, to test various options, all notes or letters I send to you or Mahathir, or vice versa, will be treated as without prejudice; that there is no agreement until all points are agreed and signed by the two PMs".

Obviously, Tun has contradicted himself! Far from trying to quote unverified oral agreements as the truth, SM Lee had actually reassured Tun Daim that anything not verified and signed by both PMs are not legally binding. Therefore, as with Tun Dr Mahathir, SM Lee also questioned the legality of oral agreements and unverified press conference statements.

2. Tun Mahathir came to the conclusion that Mr Goh has agreed to the building of the bridge without any trade-offs by quoting a letter send by Mr Goh to him, dated 11 April 2002 (Appendix 5):

"Between a new bridge to replace the entire Causeway, and one to replace just the Malaysian side of the Causeway, I like the former better. Once the new bridge is completed, the Causeway can be knocked down, which I prefer to be done after 2007. But if you wish to proceed immediately to replace just your side of the Causeway with a bridge, I shall accept it, though I think this is not ideal."

However if the whole letter is read in context, it is clear that Mr Goh was still under the impression that the agreement to the building of the bridge is based on the agreement of the package. Mr Goh has mentioned the word "package" a few times in the letter. Granted that under the heading of bridge, there was no mentioned of package but this was implied from the rest of the letter and also from his understanding up till 8 October 2002. This was reflected in the letter dated 14 October 2002 (Appendix 2) send by Dr Goh to Tun Mahathir:

"... As you wrote in the opening sentence of your letter of 7 October, you and I had reached a decision "on 27 December 1998 in Hanoi for Malaysia and Singapore to resolve, once and for all, the outstanding issues between our two countries in a package". In other words, we had agreed to trade off, in a package, the benefits to each other from the various items, namely water, POA, airspace, CPF, and the bridge to replace the Causeway."

Obviously, when Mr Goh agreed to the building of the bridge, he has the package agreement in mind.

3. On the issue of "Wayleave Agreement" I think Tun Mahathir is right for saying that Malaysia can proceed with alteration of the water pipes channelling water to Singapore after giving a six months' notice. At least in the paragraph quoted, there is no mentioned of Singapore having any right to reject any alterations after a notice is served. As I am not familiar with the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreement and without the benefit of the full Wayleave Agreement, my conclusions is based solely on what was quoted by Tun Mahathir.

4. Tun Mahathir stated that when the preliminary work on the bridge was carried out, there were no protests nor demands for sand or usage of our airspace. If he was referring to the building of the CIQ, then Tan Seri Fuzi had provided the answer when he said in para 11 and 14:

"In its Diplomatic Note dated 25 October 2003 Singapore referred to the Order of 8 October 2003 International Tribunal On the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johore and contended that Malaysia had made a unilateral decision in announcing the proposed construction of the scenic half bridge. It maintained that international facilities such as the Causeway cannot be demolished without its approval, agreement and involvement of both states and there should be mutual cooperation and consultation on the management of the Johore Straits."

"In a Note dated 29 November 2004 Singapore maintained that in facilitating its relocation of the water pipelines on Johore mainland, it was prepared to decouple construction of the new CIQ complex from the proposal to build a new bridge and treat the two projects as severable from each other. In other words, approval for the relocation of the water pipelines on mainland Johore was given by Singapore only upon obtaining Malaysia's clarifications that the relocation of the PUB water pipelines was solely for the construction of the new CIQ complex."

Singapore did make a representation when Malaysia unilaterally decided to go ahead with the building of the half bridge after awarding Gerbang Perdana the contract. Nothing was mentioned about trade offs but clearly Singapore's stand is that Malaysia cannot proceed with the bridge building without getting its agreement as mentioned by the Order of 8 October 2003 International Tribunal On the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This ruling by ITLOS resulted from a case brought Malaysia regarding Singapore's land reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor.

I am not sure if Tun Mahathir was aware of this representation as those were the last days of his premiership before he stepped down. Making a representation is a form of protest albeit not a noisy one.

5. The issue of trade offs was proposed again either in December 2004 or March 2005 by Mr Goh (who by then was the Senior Minister) to the current Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi (who took over from Tun Mahathir in 2003). (Datuk Seri Fuzi's transcript, para 18). Tun Mahathir probably did not know about this as he was no longer in government.

This unfortunate sage has highlighted the followings:

1. Treating all outstanding issues as a package is illogical and impractical. Using an "all-or-nothing" approach is futile. Some issues are easier to compromise (eg railway) while others are not (eg use of airspace). I fully agree with Tun Dr Mahathir that tying everything to everything else is very impractical and therefore his decision to tackle each issue on its own merit is understandable.

2. Leaders of any country, should not proclaim any views which later cannot be retracted without affecting national pride. No matter how frustrated or angry a leader is, when dealing with a country with seige-mentality and non-compromising attitude, diplomacy should always takes centre stage especially publicly. This will help to avoid the conditions that triggered off the bridge saga in the first place.

In conclusion, PM Badawi is probably right in scrapping the building of the bridge as it is probably non-tenable legally. It is better to be red-faced now than be humiliated later on. Tun Mahathir reacted the way he did probably because he felt slighted by the current government and not aware of any new developments since his stepping down.


Useful links:
Water Agreements between Johor and Singapore
History of Water According to Utusan Malaysia

Related blog:
The Scenic Bridge
The Scenic Bridge no more
The Scenic Bridge - legal wrangle
The Scenic Bridge - Peek behind the scenes
The Scenic Bridge - Statement from Foreign Ministry
The Scenic Bridge - Dr Mahathir's Open Letter (English translations)


PS: I am personally interested in the Scenic Bridge saga because like Tun Mahathir, I am a proud Malaysian. I felt that Malaysia has lost, and someone should be answerable.

The Scenic Bridge - a translation on the Open Letter by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

This is my translation of "Open Letter by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad" which was published by The Star Online in Malay. This translation hopefully will enable more people to understand the matter better. The original transcript can be obtained here. Readers who understand Malay are strongly encouraged to read the original transcript as the tone of the letter cannot be adequately translated.



Facts Regarding the Crooked Bridge


I wrote this open letter as a Malaysian citizen who love the country for whoever is interested in reading it.

I need to present the facts in this letter in this manner because of late not many of my statements were published, either through electronic mass media or publications, even though their representatives were present in my press conference.

Pertaining to the issue above, I had stated my view that the Malaysian government had failed to defend its sovereignty. As a result, the country suffered losses of billions of ringgit. This is the people's money.

I also wanted the people to understand Singapore's government behaviour with its ways and means as well as the Malaysian's government charges that it stopped the bridge building because of legal issues and because of the people's sentiment of not giving airspace and sale of sand to Singapore, and this was intentionally misconstrued as the people's rejection of the bridge. The people wanted the bridge but rejected Singapore's conditions, because it has no basis and not Singapore's right.

Singapore likes to publish correspondence between its leaders with Malaysian leaders with the intention of proving that it is on the side of truth.

Currently the Malaysian government believes that by not rebutting Singapore's campaign of twisting facts, the problem faced will solve by itself. However this is just wishful thinking that will not materialise.

In diplomatic norms, letters written by any party who quoted oral agreements which were supposedly reached between leaders in unofficial meetings, are not valid.

For it to be valid, negotiations must be written, recorded carefully, validated and signed by both sides. Statements made in a press conference by any one party without the verification of the other party, is also not valid.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew, when he was the Senior Minister of Singapore, liked to request for 4-eye meet without proper agenda and later recorded the outcome of the meeting in his letters to third party. (See Appendix 1)

Based on those letters, he hoped that his counterpart will agree to their contents and as a result bounded by the contents of the letters. He did not consider if his writing was not considered accurate and not verified.

I regarded anything that did not follow diplomatic norms as invalid. His assumptions are his alone, no more no less. His actions to publish his letters as prove that I had agreed did not mean anything at all. Only if I reply to the letter and verify specific facts, can the said facts be considered true. But whether it is valid and binding, depends on official verifications and agreements by both sides.

Waffling on what is considered "package" and the inability to achieve any agreement is because the impractical premise based on the package arrangement. If no agreement cannot be achieved on any one item, then there will be no agreement for all the items in the package.

Because of this reason, I suggested and Mr Goh Chok Tong agreed that we will settle each item in isolation. This was agreed to and accepted by Mr Goh Chok Tong, as the Prime Minister through a letter dated October 14 2002 (See Appendix 2) which among others said:

"Towards the end of our meeting (in Hanoi), you said that we should try to resolve the water issue, and the sooner it was done, the better. I agreed ....."

But in the same letter, Mr Goh Chok Tong said;

"I therefore did not expect to receive, on 10 October, your letter of 7 October, wherein you stated that "Malaysia has now decided to discontinue the package approach..."


BRIDGE

After rejecting the package approach, I was of the opinion that the bridge issue will not be tied to any other issues. I had high hopes when the bridge issue were mentioned in Mr Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's letters.

In one of the letters (refer to Appendix 1, para 6) to Tun Daim Zainuddin, Lee said:

"On Mahathir's Causeway bridge proposal, my PM (Goh) agrees to it, but proposes that we do not demolish the Causeway."

Seems that the people of Singapore is more agreeable if both the new bridge and the Causeway are present. This does not make sense because the reason for building a new bridge is to open up the passage on both sides of Tebrau Straits to allow free flow of water. It was no meant to increase the relationship capacity between Singapore and Johor. If this is the case, it is coincidental.

Another interesting argument by Mr Lee was (if Singapore agrees to the building of the bridge):

"Singapore will reclaim land on its side of the territory up to its border with Malaysia (refer Appendix 3, letter from Senior Minister Lee to Dr Mahathir dated Sept 8, 2001).

The border between Singapore and Malaysia in the Tebrau Strait is the deepest part of the seabed. However, for the Causeway, its border is in the middle of the bridge. If Singapore were to reclaim the sea in its territory until the border, this means that only the sea on the Malaysian side would remain. So how does it address the concept of the border based on the deepest part of the seabed? In the same letter to Daim (refer Appendix 1, para 12), Senior Minister Lee said:

"I am keeping my PM informed of my initiatives. He said however that he will leave them to me until the final stage when he will study them carefully before agreeing."

Senior Minister Lee also wrote (Appendix 1, para 12): "all notes or letters I sent to you or Mahathir, or vice-versa, will be treated as Without Prejudice; that there is no agreement until all points are agreed and signed by the two PMs."

It is clear that Senior Minister Lee was not empowered to decide on anything because he has to inform Prime Minister Goh for considerations before any agreement. If not, then there will be no agreement on all issues until verified and signed by both Prime Ministers.

In reply to my suggestion that the Keretapi Tanah Melayu terminal be build in Johor Baru, Senior Minister Lee, through letters dated 10 December 2001 (please refer Appendix 4, para 10), said:

"I hope you will also consider the long-term significance and value of the KTM rail service. Since 1923, the railway has been a valuable.... I believe keeping the railway link between Malaysia and Singapore benefits both countries..... However as the KTM is your railway, Singapore will abide by your decision."

In this letter, Senior Minister Lee pledge to abide by my decision. However, he could also say Prime Minister Goh did not agree and all our correspondence is without prejudice.

It follows, when he or Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and myself put our views in writing, it reflected our thinking. But because it is done without prejudice, we are not bound by what had been said.

Therefore, the issue of waffling and shifting goalpost did not arise. The position of the goalpost had not been determined. Since what was done was based on the concept of without prejudice, it was therefore nothing more than mere suggestions.

In a letter dated 11 April 2002 (refer Appendix 5) Prime Minister Goh said:

"I have now decided to handle directly our discussion on the bilateral package".

Only now someone with authority is talking (for Singapore).

In what can be considered the final commitment, Prime Minister Goh wrote (to me):

1. Bridge

"Between a new bridge to replace the entire Causeway, and one to replace just the Malaysian side of the Causeway, I like the former better. Once the new bridge is completed, the Causeway can be knocked down, which I prefer to be done after 2007. But if you wish to proceed immediately to replace just your side of the Causeway with a bridge, I shall accept it, though I think this is not ideal."

What conclusions can we made from this statement? Nothing was said about sand from Malaysia nor opening of airspace to Singapore's military aircrafts. Nothing was also mentioned about nostalgia, only highlighting that the Causeway be demolished after 2007.

Now it was mentioned that if Malaysia touch the water pipes to Singapore, this will be seen as an act of war. Is this a war declaration?

The clause in the "Wayleave Agreement" with Singapore is very clear. Below is what had been agreed on the water pipes:

“That the Licensee (Singapore) shall take full responsibility financially or otherwise for any alteration to the pipeline that may become necessary by reason of any alterations or improvements made or to be made on the Johor Causeway and on receiving not less than six months previous notice in writing from the Licensors (Malaysia) shall thereupon carry out the alteration in accordance with such notice and shall have no claim for any compensation.”

This agreement did not touch on right of the Licensee (Singapore) on its rejection. The phrase "Shall carry out the alteration" is very clear. Singapore should carry out the alterations. If Singapore refuses, this may be seen as an act of war and not the other way round.

When the preliminary work on the bridge was carried out, there was no protests nor demands for sand or usage of our airspace. Now the building of the bridge on our territory seemed to be dependent on the condition that we sell millions of cubic meters of sand to Singapore to reclaim the sea and open up our airspace to its military aircraft. Where do all these conditions come from? What is the connection between the expansion of Singapore's territory and our building of a bridge within our own territory?

Singapore's demands to tie the building of the bridge in our territory to our sale of sand and opening up the airspace are totally baseless.

Why the need for the Malaysian government to sell sand and opening up the airspace to Singapore if it was not force to stop the building of the crooked bridge in our own territory is beyond my comprehension.

It is the Malaysian's right not to sell sand to Singapore or to open up the airspace to it. But the people never mentioned they were ready to sacrifice the bridge project. What they rejected was to give in to Singapore's demand that we sell sand and open the airspace. They wanted the bridge but they also wanted their Government to dispute Singapore's demands because legally Malaysia does not have to entertain Singapore's terms.

Singapore's actions were expected. But the Malaysian government failed to defend the nation's sovereignty. In addition, this has caused the loss of billions of the people's money.

Let the people of Malaysia, especially the Malays and namely those from Johor, to remember that the British had tricked the Sultan into handing over Singapore to them for free.

Like Penang, Lumut, and Melaka, Singapore should have been returned to us when the British relinquished their rights. But Singapore had become so foreign that it could not become part of Malaysia anymore.

Will Malaysia now gives more land to Singapore so that it can expand its territory and increase its population? To give up our seabed to Singapore is no different from giving our land to Singapore. The end result is the extension of Singapore's territory. This is no different from giving up parts of Johor for this purpose. Are we so poor that we need to sell a piece of our soil to others?

The coming generations of Malaysians, whether Malay or Johorean, will curse us if we do all these even though we have the right to build a bridge on our own soil and sea as an independent and sovereign country.

It is enough that we gave up Singapore (to the British). There is no need for us to give up more of our land to Singapore even though there are those who felt that we can build a bridge in our country only if Singapore agrees.

Malaysians had never shared the same opinions. Nobody should put words into their mouth just because that person is afraid to defend the rights and sovereignty of the country and the people.

Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad
19 April, 2006


Link:
The Scenic Bridge - Statement from Foreign Ministry

The Scenic Bridge - Statement from Foreign Ministry on Bridge Issue

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

STATEMENT BY YBHG TAN SRI AHMAD FUZI BIN HJ ABDUL RAZAK, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE BRIDGE ISSUE
(Lifted from The Star Online)

1. The proposed construction of a new bridge to replace the Johore Causeway has created a lot of controversy and media coverage on the issue continues to attract public attention.

2. As the coordinating Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been directly involved in the bilateral negotiations with Singapore on the bridge proposal. I wish to clarify some of the major issues including the chronological events surrounding the bridge proposal so as to put them in the proper perspective.

3. In addressing the issue, I wish to highlight in particular the confusion pertaining to the proposal for a full straight bridge and the alternative proposal for a scenic half bridge (termed crooked by the media) and the scenic full bridge; the political and legal dimensions pertaining to the proposed unilateral construction of a scenic half bridge by Malaysia including Singapore's position; the bilateral negotiations involving sand and airspace as trade-offs and the Malaysian Government's decision not to finally proceed with any bridge proposal.

4. To begin with, the idea of building a bridge to replace the Johore Causeway was first announced by the Government during the launching of the Johore Bahru Waterfront City by YABhg. Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamed, then Prime Minister of Malaysia on 5 July 1996. It was clear that the bridge that Malaysia had in mind then was a full straight bridge.

5. Malaysia had originally treated the proposed bridge issue as outside the four package of outstanding bilateral issues namely water, Points of Agreement (POA), Central Provident Fund (CPF) and airspace as agreed upon between YABhg. Tun and the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore on 17 December 1998 in Hanoi. The course of events however, made it difficult for the bridge issue to be discussed separately from the other outstanding issues in the package.

6. Bilateral negotiations through the exchange of letters, Four-Eyed Meetings between YABhg. Tun as Prime Minister and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Meetings at Senior Officials and Ministerial level during the period of March 1999 to September 2002 failed to reach agreement on various technical aspects of the bridge proposal as well as other issues within the package.

7. YABhg. Tun then wrote to Senior Minister LeeKuan Yew on 4 March 2002 on the package of issues covering water, bridge and rail including water pipelines, Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ), CPF and air space. The Government's proposal on the road bridge, railway bridge and water pipelines issues are as follows:-

A new bridge will be built to replace the Causeway. Malaysia will build the bridge on the Malaysian side at its own cost while Singapore will build the bridge on the Singapore side at its own cost. The bridge will connect at the common boundary in the Straits of Johore. Once the bridge is completed, the Causeway will be demolished.

Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge on its side, Malaysia intends to build the bridge on the Singapore side at its own cost. The new bridge will jointhe remaining Causeway on Singapore's side. Once the bridge is completed, the Causeway on the Malaysian side will be demolished.

Malaysia will build a new railway bridge across the Johore Straits. This railway bridge will include a railway swing bridge on the part of the Johore Straits that will be deepened for navigational purposes.

Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge to replace the Causeway on its side, Malaysia will build a railway on its side in the Johore Straits. This railway bridge will include a railway swing bridge on the part of the Johore Straits that will be deepened for navigational purposes. The new railway bridge will join existing railway track on the remaining Causeway on Singapore's side.

New water pipelines on the Malaysian side will be installed by Malaysia and will reconnect with the Singapore water pipelines under the new bridge.

Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge to replace the Causeway on its side, the new water pipelines on the part of the Johore Straits that will be deepened for navigational purposes will be buried under the seabed and will reconnect with the Singapore water pipelines.

8. On 11 April 2002 the then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong conveyed Singapore's response vide a letter to YABhg. Tun on the outstanding issues covering bridge, railway, water, CPF and air space. On the bridge issue, Singapore's position was as follows:

“Between a new bridge to replace the entire Causeway, and one to replace just the Malaysian side of the Causeway. I like the former better. Once the new bridge is completed, the Causeway can be knocked down, which I prefer to be done after 2007. But if you wish to proceed immediately to replace just your side of the Causeway with a bridge, I shall accept it, though I think this is not ideal.”

9. Two Ministerial Meetings were held in July and September 2002 to further discuss the outstanding issues within the package. As no agreement was reached, YBhg. Tun wrote to the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong on 7 October 2002 inter alia as follows:-

“As you are aware, since our above decision, several meetings both at Ministerial and officials levels, had been held on the package of issues. Regrettably, three rounds of talks at the senior officials level in 1999 and two Ministerial-level Meetings in 2002 did not meet with any success.

In addition Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew also had several sessions with me discussing the same package but no agreement could be reached.

I think we have now come to a point where it would be important for us to prioritise our discussions. The approach that both sides had adopted so far in dealing with the outstanding issues in a package, has not yielded any meaningful results. In view of this, Malaysia has now decided to discontinue the packageapproach and to give the highest priority to first resolving the long-delayed water issue, particularly the price review of raw water. Once this issue is satisfactorily and amicably resolved, I am confident that Malaysia and Singapore would be able to move forward much faster in finding solutions to the other outstanding issues that stand in the way of our bilateral relations.”

10. Singapore's reaction was reflected in the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's letter to YABhg. Tun on 14 October 2002 when he decided to withdraw the concession that he said Singapore was prepared to make as trade-offs involving the bridge and other issues under the package. Singapore later further explained in a Diplomatic Note dated 29 November 2004 that the agreement given by the then Singapore Prime Minister “was made in the context of the then ongoing negotiations between the twoGovernments as an overall package of bilateral issues. With the termination of the package negotiations the underlying basis for the statements in the letter of 11 April 2002 no longer exists”.

11. A legalistic approach was taken by Singapore when Malaysia decided to proceed with the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) Complex at Bukit Chagar and the unilateral construction of the scenic half bridge and new railway bridge projects on the Malaysian side of the Johore Causeway after giving the necessary contracts to Gerbang Perdana Sdn Bhd in 2003. In its Diplomatic Note dated 25 October 2003 Singapore referred to the Order of 8 October 2003 International Tribunal On the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johore and contended that Malaysia had made a unilateral decision in announcing the proposed construction of the scenic half bridge. It maintained that international facilities such as the Causeway cannot be demolished without its approval, agreement and involvement of both states and there should be mutual cooperation and consultation on the management of the Johore Straits.

12. Singapore's position on Malaysia's CIQ complex and the scenic half bridge and new railway projects was finally reflected in its decision with regard to the relocation of Singapore Public Utilities Board (PUB) water pipelines. It effectively invoked PUB's ownership of the water pipelines as provided for under the 1961 and 1962 Johore-Singapore Water Agreements that was subsequently guaranteed under the 1965 Separation Agreement between Malaysia and Singapore.

13. In giving its legal opinion, the Attorney General's Chambers confirmed the above interpretation with respect to PUB's ownership of the water pipelines under the 1961 and 1962 Johore-Singapore Water Agreements and “that Malaysia is required to obtain prior approval of PUB in relation to the alteration of the water pipelines necessitated by the construction of a bridge, whether it is a full straight bridge or a scenic bridge (half bridge)”.

14. Taking advantage of the above Agreements, Singapore made a clear distinction between the relocation of PUB water pipelines on mainland Johore and the relocation of PUB water pipelines along the Malaysian part of the Johore Causeway in relation to the construction of the scenic half bridge. In a Note dated 29 November 2004 Singapore maintained that in facilitating its relocation of the water pipelines on Johore mainland, it was prepared to decouple construction of the new CIQ complex from the proposal to build a new bridge and treat the two projects as severable from each other. In other words, approval for the relocation of the water pipelines on mainland Johore was given by Singapore only upon obtaining Malaysia's clarifications that the relocation of the PUB water pipelines was solely for the construction of the new CIQ complex. The relocation of the PUB water pipelines along the Malaysian part of the Johore Causeway in relation to the unilateral construction of the scenic half bridge however would be treated as a different issue altogether.

15. After taking over the Prime Ministership on 30 October 2003, YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi visited Singapore on 12 January 2004. The bridge issue was not specifically discussed but YAB the Prime Minister urged both sides to tackle the issues that are easier to resolve first. He explained the approach by using the metaphor of “plucking the ripe fruit first,” whereby both sides should pluck the low hanging fruit first, and then move on to the higher ones on the tree. He subsequently urged both sides to explore new approaches and, “to think out of the box” in order to avoid the previous deadlock that besieged their bilateral negotiations.

16. YAB Dato’ Seri Prime Minister's above visit paved the way for an improved political climate of cooperation with both sides expressing the desire to amicably resolve the outstanding issues. It was in this context that related works pertaining to the scenic bridge and the railway bridge were suspended on 5 February 2004.

17. During the visit of Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to Malaysia on 4–5 October 2004, both sides agreed to revisit the full straight bridge proposal, as originally conceived by YABhg. Tun, by resuscitating negotiations on the issue. In this context, YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi reiterated the rationale behind Malaysia's proposal including the need to allow free flow of water so as to improve water quality in the Straits of Johore, to overcome traffic congestion on the Causeway and to allow navigation and promote commercial and recreational activities along the Straits.

18. The full straight bridge proposal was again raised by YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during the two visits of Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong to Malaysia on 13 December 2004 and 1 March 2005 respectively. During the first visit, Malaysia officially presented the design of the full straight bridge for Singapore's consideration. Singapore continued to maintain that the bridge would bring no benefits to Singapore in return for the S$725 million that it would have to allocate for its part of the project. He nevertheless suggested that it would be easier for Singapore to favourably consider Malaysia's proposal if it were to lift the ban on the export of sand to Singapore that was imposed on 15 January 1997 and reinstate all the rights with regard to the use of Malaysia's airspace that had been withdrawn on 16 September 1998. This was the first time that sand was linked by Singapore to the bridge issue. Singapore was previously enjoying the supply of sand from Malaysia by using the private sector.

19. To move forward with further discussions, both sides agreed for Senior Officials to meet as a follow up. A Ministerial Level Meeting was also proposed. Malaysia subsequently took the initiative to send a technical team to Singapore to give a technical briefing on the full straight bridge proposal on 28 January 2005. Singapore merely took note of the briefing without giving any specific commitments.

20. It was against the above backdrop that five meetings were held by Senior Officials of both sides between 7 September 2005 to 11 March 2006. Focus was given on the full straight bridge proposal with appropriate video presentation made to the Singapore delegation as a way of persuading Singapore to appreciate the merits of such a proposal. The Malaysian delegation's approach was to discuss the full straight bridge proposal as a stand alone issue based on its merits. In this regard, the Malaysian side even offered to Singapore the possibility of Malaysia considering to bear the entire cost for the construction of the bridge in return for Singapore's agreement without linking it to other issues.

21. It was obvious from the very first meeting that Singapore was more interested to negotiate on the basis of balance of mutual benefits involving sand and airspace. Singapore also preferred to build the bridge on a cost sharing basis if agreement was reached between the two sides. It subsequently dawned on the Malaysian delegation that, short of calling off of the Meeting altogether, progress could only be achieved on the basis of the balance of mutual benefit principle.

22. Armed with expert advice from the relevant Agencies and the mandate given by the Cabinet, the Malaysian delegation crafted a “Broad Political Understanding” (BPU) that incorporated elements constituting the balance of benefits, in respect of the bridge proposal. The BPU, agreed uponin principle, was not a final document and was subjected to the approval of the respective Governments. It was intended to provide the basis for follow up detailed technical and legal negotiations with a view to concluding a Final Agreement to be approved by the respective Governments.

23. In including sand as an element in the BPU, consideration was given to Malaysia's precedent in exporting sand to Singapore, the quality and quantity available, location, royalty, issuance of license, State and Federal Government procedures, rules and regulations pertaining to the dredging of sand, related terms and conditions and the need for effective enforcement to prevent the illegal supply of sand to Singapore.

24. With regard to airspace, Singapore's request was not something new as Malaysia had previously granted five privileges to RSAF before they were withdrawn in 1998. Singapore wanted Malaysia to reinstate all the privileges that it used to enjoy but with Ministry of Defence's approval only two such privileges namely, Search and Rescue and Northern Corridor Transit, were considered. Even then the Search and Rescue privilege was offered on the basis of reciprocity. The Northern Transit Corridor privilege would also not involve RSAF's permanent presence in Malaysia's airspace but merely a technical presence for transit purposes.

25. At all times during the discussions, account was taken of the need to protect Malaysia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest in applying the principle of balance of mutual benefits.

26. The Government decided to give itself some time before deciding on the BPU considering the socio-political dynamics prevailing within the country. The Barisan Nasional MPs were accordingly given a briefing on 28 March 2006 by YB Minister of Foreign Affairs to clarify the various options available to the Government. At the back of the Government's mind was the need to make a final decision that would reflect a consensus amongst the people of Malaysia. This was very much in accordance with the principle, approach and conduct of the present leadership in dealing with important issues of interest to the Malaysian public.

27. To be more specific, the Government had Four Options to consider:-

i) The first option wasto approve the BPU and proceed with detailed negotiations to conclude a Final Agreement. The BPU could be considered as the least objectionable compromise to secure a full straight bridge to be left as a legacy for future generations. As a strong Government with more than a two thirds majority in Parliament, the Government could have gone ahead with the BPU and subsequently persuade Malaysians to accept the compromise as they begin to enjoy the convenience of a new full straight bridge after its completion.

The problem however, was to obtain a clear consensus in the short term, taking into account public sentiments and the lingering concern of being seen to be giving in too much to Singapore for the sake of a bridge to replace the Johore Causeway.

Malaysia could have offered to Singapore other concessions instead of sand and airspace. However, considering Singapore's present immediate needs, no other concessions other than these two could be more important to Singapore.

(ii) The second option was to proceed with the scenic half bridge that would join the Singapore part of the Johore Causeway. The scenic bridge would be within Malaysia's territory and a simplistic consideration would suggest this to be an appropriate alternative to the full straight bridge.

The biggest problem however, based on expert advice is the need to consult and obtain the necessary approval of Singapore for the relocation of PUB water pipelines in the context of the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements and the 1965 Separation Agreement mentioned above. As a responsible member of the international community Malaysia has to abide by the various principles of international law.

Going by Singapore's known position there is no assurance that Singapore would not request for a balance of interests involving sand and airspace before considering its approval and extending its cooperation in respect of the relocation of the pipelines along the Malaysian part of the Johore Causeway for the construction of a scenic half bridge. If it comes to this during negotiations with Singapore, it would be highly regrettable if Malaysia has to concede on sand and airspace in return for a scenic half bridge instead of a full straight bridge.

As pointed out by the Attorney General's Chambers, Singapore could even halt the usage of the remaining Singaporean part of the Causeway by KTM on account of structural integrity upon the unilateral demolishment of the Malaysian part of the Causeway. This will directly affect the running of railway services to Singapore. Should this subsist for six months, it would attract section 4 of the Singapore Railway Transfer Ordinance (Chapter 320) and “Singapore Railway Land” (namely, KTM lands) will revert to Singapore.

(iii) The third option was to unilaterally build a scenic half bridge that could eventually be linked to become a full scenic bridge with Singapore. The same arguments as in (ii) above could apply. There is in addition no guarantee that Singapore would agree to build its side of the bridge without a balance of interests within the period of construction of Malaysia's part of the bridge. This element of uncertainty would mean that Malaysia would eventually end up having to proceed with a scenic half bridge or an incomplete half bridge “waiting” to be linked by Singapore at its pleasure. Such a “hanging bridge” would no doubt become a subject of ridicule that would affect the image of Malaysia as a whole.

(iv) The fourth option was not to proceed with any bridge at all. This was finally the decision taken by the Government. If a compromise is considered too much under the first option in view of strong public sentiments, this should be the best option.

This option means that Malaysia need not have to consider lifting the ban on the export of sand and granting to RSAF the limited privileges in the use of its airspace vis-a-vis Search and Rescue and Northern Corridor Transit. Malaysia can now even consider imposing a complete ban on the export of sand to anycountry as a matter of policy if public sentiments on the issue is as strong as reflected in the media. Such a policy, backed by an appropriate national legislation, would be a strong deterrent to prevent the illegal export of sand.

The Government's decision to scrap the bridge project would also have the advantage of preventing the two sides from being embroiled in endless political bickering and legal disputes. The decision is not necessarily a win-lose situation. Malaysia did not really lose even if it did not get the bridge. Singapore too did not look at Malaysia's decision in terms of victory or defeat. After all, Singapore too did not get what it wanted in respect of sand and airspace.

28. The Government believes that building a bridge to connect two neighbouring countries should serve to promote friendly people-to-people contacts and interaction. Undertaking the unilateral construction of a bridge by having to resort to political and legal wrangling and disputes are not necessarily the best way to promote bilateral relations. The Government's decision, as stated by YAB the Prime Minister himself, was a political decision, a collective decision made by the Cabinet, taking into account all relevant factors. It is indeed the prerogative of the Government of the day to make such a decision. Organising a referendum and making a decision on the basis of such a referendum has never been the practice of the Government nor a tradition in Malaysia.

29. Given all the above considerations, circumstances and complexities, the political decision collectively made by the Cabinet was ultimately the best decision in support of Malaysia's national interest.

30. An important lesson can certainly be drawn by this bridge episode. Bilateral negotiations between Malaysia and Singapore continue to be affected by public sentiments and emotions associated with the historical baggage arising from Singapore's 1965 Separation from Malaysia. More must certainly must be done by both sides to allow the two countries to move ahead in nurturing mutually beneficial cooperative relations.

31. With the decision taken by the Government not to proceed with the bridge proposal and the contract given to the relevant company to complete the facilities linking the Causeway to the new CIQ complex in Johore Bahru, Malaysia's interest would now be better served by devoting all efforts towards ensuring the maximum utilization of the facilities concerned.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wisma Putra
Putrajaya



24 April 2006


Link:
The Scenic Bridge - Dr Mahathir's Open Letter (English translations)

The Scenic Bridge - Badawi rebuts

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

The Malaysian government yesterday rebutted former PM Dr Mahathir criticism regarding the bridge issue. Dr Mahathir had said that the government had surrendered Malaysia's sovereign when it decided to scrap the building of the bridge. He claimed that the law was on Malaysia side and therefore it could have brought the case to the International Court of Justice. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, the former secretary-general of the Foreign Ministry, who lead the negotiations was asked by the Badawi government to explain the reasoning behind the scrapping of the bridge. This was published by New Straits Times today.

It is good for the Badawi government to explain the how the Cabinet has come to scrapping the project. This will allow the public to determine for themselves on the merit or otherwise. However few questions arises from the rebuttal.

Since Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi was the leader in the negotiation party when Dr Mahathir was still the Prime Minister, was the change in the position of the Singapore government after October 2002 and its legal implications made known to the former PM? Similarly was the legal opinion of Attorney-General office conveyed to him? And if the legal implications were conveyed, why did Dr Mahathir chose to ignore it?

Why was the opinion given by Dr Mahathir's former aide, Matthias Chang, contradicted with that of Tan Sri Ahmad? I am sure both officials must have had the relevant informations for their perusal. If so, why the difference in opinion?

What was the role of Syed Hamid, the Foreign Minister and Rais Yatim, the former de-facto Law Minister? Rais Yatim was named as one of the persons who was given a 14-volume report by Matthias Chang. Although Syed Hamid was not named, Matthias Chang however had thrown down the gauntlet when he dared Syed Hamid to sue him in court if what he said was not true. For him to openly challenged an UMNO minister, he must have some very good reasons.

The most pertinent question is why Syed Hamid, Rais Yatim, the Attorney-General Office and even Badawi himself could not have changed or at least voiced their concerns to Dr Mahathir with regards to its implications. Badawi himself was still talking about building the Scenic Bridge two weeks before he made the U-turn. Is the failure to stop the unilateral decision to build the bridge due to one man's pride; or was it a collective decision despite the clear legal implications? Or was it because of a bungled report from Dr Mahathir's aide?

It is good that Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi has decided to publish the events leading to this fateful decision. If this is the start of things to come, then I am sure Malaysians will have a brighter future because finally the government is talking about accountability. However, in the interest of accountability, the Prime Minister should not just stop there. He has to pursue the matter further and find out who was ultimately responsible for this debacle and take the necessary actions. This is because national pride has been dented and somebody must be answerable.


Related blog:
The Scenic Bridge
The Scenic Bridge no more
The Scenic Bridge - legal wrangle
The Scenic Bridge - Peek behind the scenes
The Scenic Bridge - Statement from Foreign Ministry
The Scenic Bridge - Dr Mahathir's Open Letter (English translation)

The Scenic Bridge - Malaysian Government's 4 options

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

'Government's political decision to go for Option 4' (Lifted from NST)

AMBASSADOR-at-large Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak explains the four options on the table.

OPTION 1: Approve the BPU (Broad Political Understanding) and proceed with detailed negotiations to conclude a final agreement. With such a strong mandate, the Government could have gone ahead with the project and persuaded Malaysians later. But the problem is the lingering concern that too much is being given away for the sake of the bridge.

OPTION 2: Proceed with the half-bridge to join the Singapore part of the Johor Causeway. Biggest problem with this option is that expert advice shows the need to consult and obtain approval of Singapore for the relocation of PUB water pipelines in the context of water and separation agreements. Attorney-General also points out that if the Malaysian part of the Causeway is demolished unilaterally, Singapore could even halt KTMB's (Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad) use of the remaining Singapore part of the Causeway on account of structural integrity. This will directly affect the running of railway services to Singapore. Should this continue for six months, KTMB land in Singapore will revert to the republic.

OPTION 3: Unilaterally build a half-bridge that can eventually be linked to become a full bridge. No guarantee that Singapore would agree to build its side of the bridge without a balance of interests. This element of uncertainty would mean that Malaysia would be waiting for the bridge to be linked at Singapore's pleasure. Such a hanging bridge would become a subject of ridicule and would affect Malaysia's image.

OPTION 4: Not to proceed with any bridge. This was the option chosen by the Government, taking into account public sentiment on exporting sand and opening up airspace to the republic. The Government's decision to scrap the bridge project would prevent both sides from being embroiled in endless political bickering and legal disputes. The decision is not necessarily a win-lose situation. Malaysia did not lose even if it did not get the bridge. Singapore too did not get what it wanted — sand and airspace.

CONCLUSION: The Government's decision was a political decision; a collective decision of the Cabinet. Making a decision on the basis of a referendum has never been the practice of the Government, nor a tradition in Malaysia.

The Scenic Bridge - Peek behind the scenes

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

The Scenic Bridge: Peek behind the scenes (Lifted from NST)
25 Apr 2006

So much has been said since the Government announced that it was scrapping the plan to build a bridge to replace the Causeway. A clutch of critics, including former Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, has argued that Malaysia should have gone ahead and built a half-bridge. They say the law was on Malaysia’s side to proceed unilaterally. Yesterday, Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, ambassador-at-large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offered a peek into what went on behind the scenes.

5 July 1996: Dr Mahathir announces plan to build a bridge while launching the JB Waterfront City.

17 December 1998: Dr Mahathir and the then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong agree to treat the proposed bridge outside the package of unresolved issues, including water and airspace. Events make it difficult for the bridge to be discussed separately from other issues.

March 1999 to Sept 2002: Despite negotiations and an exchange of letters between Dr Mahathir and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and among officials, both sides fail to reach agreement on technical aspects of the bridge, as well as other issues.

4 March 2002: Dr Mahathir writes to Lee on the package of issues covering water, the bridge, CPF, airspace, etc. The Government's proposal on the road bridge, railway bridge and water pipelines are as follows:
“A new bridge will be built to replace the Causeway. Malaysia will build the bridge on the Malaysian side at its own cost, while Singapore will build the bridge on the Singapore side at its own cost. The bridge will connect at the common boundary in the Strait of Johor. Once the bridge is completed, the Causeway will be demolished.
“Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge on its side, Malaysia intends to build the bridge on the Singapore side at its own cost. The new bridge will join the remaining Causeway on Singapore's side. Once the bridge is completed, the Causeway on the Malaysian side will be demolished.
“Malaysia will build a new railway bridge across the Johor Strait. This railway bridge will include a railway swing bridge on the part of the strait that will be deepened for navigational purposes.
“Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge to replace the Causeway on its side, Malaysia will build a railway on its side in the Johor Strait. This railway bridge will include a railway swing bridge on the part of the Johor Strait that will be deepened for navigational purposes. The new railway bridge will join the existing railway track on the remaining Causeway on Singapore's side.
“New water pipelines on the Malaysian side will be installed by Malaysia and will reconnect with the Singapore water pipelines under the new bridge.
“Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge to replace the Causeway on its side, the new water pipelines on the part of the Johor Strait that will be deepened for navigational purposes will be buried under the seabed and will reconnect with the Singapore water pipelines.”

11 April 2002: PM Goh gives Singapore's response to Dr Mahathir in a letter. On the bridge, Singapore's position is:
“Between a new bridge to replace the entire Causeway, and one to replace just the Malaysian side of the Causeway, I like the former. Once the new bridge is completed, the Causeway can be knocked down, which I prefer to be done after 2007. But if you wish to proceed immediately to replace just your side of the Causeway with a bridge, I shall accept it, though I think this is not ideal."

July and Sept 2002: Two ministerial meetings held to discuss package of issues, with little success.

7 Oct 2002: Dr Mahathir writes to Goh:
“As you are aware, since our above decision, several meetings both at ministerial and officials level, have been held on the package of issues. Regrettably, three rounds of talks at the senior officials level in 1999 and two ministerial-level meetings in 2002 did not meet with any success.
“In addition, Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew also had several sessions with me discussing the same package but no agreement could be reached.
“I think we have now come to a point where it would be important for us to prioritise our discussions. The approach that both sides have adopted so far in dealing with the outstanding issues in a package has not yielded any meaningful results.
“In view of this, Malaysia has now decided to discontinue the package approach and to give the highest priority to first resolving the long-delayed water issue, particularly the price of raw water.
“Once this issue is satisfactorily and amicably resolved, I am confident that Malaysia and Singapore would be able to move forward much faster in finding solutions to the other outstanding issues that stand in the way of our bilateral relations.”

14 October 2002: Goh writes to Dr Mahathir, saying he has decided to withdraw the concession he had said Singapore was prepared to make as part of trade-offs involving the bridge and related issues.In a diplomatic note, Singapore explains that the agreement given by Goh was “made in the context of the then ongoing negotiations between the two Governments as an overall package of bilateral issues. With the termination of the package negotiations, the underlying basis for the statements in the letter of 11 April 2002 no longer exists.”

25 Oct 2003: After Malaysia decides to proceed with building the CIQ complex in Bukit Chagar and awards contracts to build a half-bridge, Singapore issues a diplomatic note. The republic refers to an order by the international tribunal on the Law of the Sea in 2003 concerning land reclamation by Singapore in and around the Johor Strait. It contends that Malaysia made a unilateral decision in announcing the plan to build a half-bridge, and maintains that international facilities such as the Causeway cannot be demolished without its approval and agreement. Singapore's position on the CIQ complex, half-bridge and railway projects is reflected in its decision to relocate the Public Utilities Board water pipelines. It invokes PUB's ownership of the pipelines under the 1961 and 1962 water agreements, subsequently guaranteed under the 1965 Separation Agreement. The Attorney-General's Chambers in a legal opinion says “Malaysia is required to obtain prior approval of PUB in relation to the alteration of the water pipelines necessitated by the construction of a bridge, whether it is a full straight bridge or a scenic bridge (half bridge)”.

4 and 5 Oct 2004: Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visits Malaysia and agrees to revisit idea of straight bridge.

13 December 2004: Senior Minister Goh visits Malaysia. Malaysia officially presents designs of the straight bridge for Singapore's consideration. Singapore maintains the bridge would bring no benefit but it would have to fork out S$725 million for its part of the project. Goh says it would be easier for Singapore to consider the project if Malaysia lifts the ban on export of sand and reinstates all rights to use Malaysian airspace. This is the first time sand is linked to bridge project.

Sept 2005 and 11 March 2006: Five meetings held by senior officials from both sides. Focus is on the straight bridge. Malaysia's position is to discuss the full straight bridge proposal as a stand-alone issue. Malaysia also offers the possibility of bearing entire cost of project in return for Singapore's agreement. Singapore more interested in negotiating on basis of mutual benefit involving sand and airspace. Also wants to build on basis of cost-sharing if agreement reached between both sides. Dawns on Malaysian delegation that, short of calling off the meetings, progress can only be achieved on basis of balance of mutual benefits. Armed with expert advice and the Cabinet mandate, Malaysian delegation crafts a “Broad Political Understanding”, meant to provide the basis for detailed technical and legal negotiations. In including sand as an element, consideration is given to Malaysia's precedents in exporting sand to Singapore, the quantity, royalty,etc. With regard to airspace, Singapore wants all privileges reinstated, but with the Defence Ministry's approval only two privileges, namely search-and-rescue and northern corridor transit, are considered. Government decides to give itself some time before deciding on the BPU, considering the socio-political dynamics prevailing in the country.

28 March 2005: Foreign Minister briefs Barisan Nasional MPs. At the back of the Government's mind is the need to make a decision that would reflect consensus among Malaysians. This is consistent with the approach of the current leadership.

29 Nov 2004: Singapore made clear of the distinction between the relocation of PUB pipelines on mainland Johor and relocation of pipelines along the Malaysian part of the Causeway.

The Scenic Bridge - legal wrangle

Categories: Malaysia, Singapore

The Malaysian government had made a U-turn and scraped the building of the Scenic bridge to replace the Causeway on April 12. Since then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi had been criticised by the former PM Dr Mahathir with the most scanting attack which was quoted as "I never thought in my lifetime that this country would surrender its sovereignty to anybody." So who is right?

The official reasons for the scrapping the building of the bridge is because the people opposed to the selling of sand and letting the Singapore Air Force (SAF) to use Malaysian airspace as trade-off and because "of legal implications and complications should the project have gone ahead". This was done in the interest of the nation according to Syed Hamid, the Foreign Minister. He said that the Second Link is still under-utilised and the law is on Malaysian side if the building of the bridge were to go ahead. However a day later, Najib was reported as saying that "Malaysia does not have a sovereign right to unilaterally replace its half of the Causeway with a new half-bridge, because the structure will affect both countries".

The situation got more murky when Dr Mahathir got into the fray. He recounted that when he first proposed the project in 1996, there was no opposition either from Singapore or the people and there was no question of legal implications. Regarding the water issues he said: "Under the Separation Agreement, Malaysia can move the water pipes by giving Singapore six months' notice, after which Singapore would have to comply at its own expense. This has already been done with Singapore's Public Utility Board moving some of the water pipes on land near the Causeway to facilitate work on the CIQ complex." And if all else fails, he said Malaysia could have brought the matter to the International Court of Justice.

This was supported by his former aide, Matthias Chang, who accused Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar of giving "wrong advice" to the government over the building of a new bridge. He claimed that he had compiled a 14-volume report on the issue for Dr Mahathir with issues given to Datuk Rais Yatim, the then-de facto Law Minister, the Attorney General and other relevant parties. He claimed there was no issue of legal implications and quoted a letter from previous Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 2002. In it PM Goh stated that ""Between a new bridge to replace the entire Causeway and one to replace just the Malaysian side of the Causeway, I like the former better... once the new bridge is completed, the Causeway can be knocked down, which I prefer to be done after 2007. But if you (Dr Mahathir) wish to proceed immediately to replace just your side of the Causeway with a bridge, I shall accept it, though I think this is not ideal". There was no discussion on any trade-offs.

So who is right - the former PM Dr Mahathir or the current PM Badawi?

According to 2 experts on international law, Malaysia had made the right move to avoid legal risk. One of them pointed out that the water pipes and railway track on the Causeway were subjected to bilateral agreements signed by Malaysia and Singapore and "under international law no country shall, on its own, amend or change anything which are dictated by bilateral agreements without prior negotiations with the other country" and "... under the Water Agreement between Johor and Singapore signed in 1961 and 1962, Malaysia was required to obtain prior approval from the Singapore government".

For PM Badawi to stop the building of the bridge and in the process dents Malaysia's national pride, there must be a very good reason; and to me is because Malaysia is on the wrong side of the law. Dr Mahathir had put national pride at stake when he announced that Malaysia has a right to build the bridge on its side of the strait. And PM Badawi had the unenviable task to handle the aftermath of a 'decree' given in a fit of anger. This is probably the best decision under the circumstances albeit a painful and maybe unpopular one. It is better to swallow some pride then to face bigger embarassment later on.

Another telltale sign that Malaysia may be legally disadvantage is the way ministers falling over each other trying to justify the cancellation of the bridge. Syed Hamid said the law in on Malaysia's side but the Deputy Prime Minister said that Malaysia does not have the sovereign right to unilaterally remove the Causeway. Syed Hamid had also used the under-utilisation of the Second Link as a justification. If this is the case, why the need to replace the Causeway in the first place? Since theoritically by building a new bridge, the daily traffic jam on the Malaysian side would be reduced and thus will encourage motorist to use the new bridge at the expense of the Second Link. No logic here.

Whatever is the reasons for cancellation of the bridge, only Abdullah Badawi and the cabinet knows the truth. National pride had been dented. As national sovereignty and dignity is involved, the government owes its citizen an explanation. Where has it gone wrong? Why was the decision so different despite having essentially the same Cabinet ministers? Is it because of one man's frustrations that national pride was put to the gamble? Or is it because of the weakness of one man, that national pride were traded? I therefore hope that Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi will give a full picture so as to practice what he had preached - accountability. For like what Dr Mahathir said: "Singapore did not win but Malaysia lost".


Related blog:
The Scenic Bridge
The Scenic Bridge no more

Disrespectful or being professional?

Categories: Singapore

There has been much debate about the conduct of the 10 post-1965 adults who had the privilege to a question-and-answer session with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. The main charge is that one of disrespect.

I pitied these 10 people many of whom are journalists. They were tasked to ask MM Lee any questions. This were apparently reinforced during the pre-recording tea reception by MM Lee himself. Imagine this: 'ordinary' young adults having to question a somebody, the Minister Mentor, on national TV. Most of us would have been over-awed to even ask the most irrelevant questions. The fact that they are able to ask relevant intelligent questions, questions that are supposed to matter to their generation shows how professional they are. If they were to ask superficial questions, wouldn't it be a waste of MM's time?

The question of disrespect comes about because one of the participant asked why MM at 82 years old had not considered retirement. I feel that he is not being respectful. He is merely asking a pertinent question as so much had been said about self-renewal and yet the most senior member in the PAP had chosen to stay on. Rather than speculating on the reasons behind this decision why not let the man himself clarify? I am sure this question had been on everyone's mind including those who cited disrespect regarding this question.

Observers had been quick to conclude that there is a gap in the thinking between the older and younger generation. I think this is too simplistic. Firstly the way the dialogue session was conducted is artificial. The participant are entrusted with a task - to ask questions. The scope of interaction is thus limited. They cannot clarify much as to why the questions were asked. I am sure most of the questions will not be repeated to MM outside of the show. There is also a question of time. To make the session successful a certain number of questions need to be asked. Therefore there is not much room to dwell more into a question.

Statisticians will tell you that 10 people cannot be representative of the nearly 2 million adults of their generations. Majority of the participants are journalists, people trained to ask difficult questions - questions not necessarily reflecting the views of the majority.

Whatever the outcome from this dialogue, I must commend the MM for being able to put 10 'ordinary' young adults so much at ease that they are able to ask difficult questions and enthuasistic enough to interrupt the MM. And to the 10 participants, you had done what the majority dare not.

Surveillance camera to catch road offenders

Categories: Malaysia

Malaysia plans to install a digital camera system to catch speedster. It plan to installs such cameras along accident-prone areas along trunk-roads and highways and certain road junctions in urban areas. What is noble about this plan is that this camera work will be carried out by a private company who will be paid by a commissions for each motorist fined. The installation and maintainance will entirely be carried out by the company. A case of something from nothing! If all goes according to plan, the cameras will be up by next year.

By privatising the camera system, the government will be freed from paying for the set up and it maintainance. This means the setup is fairly cheap for the government. Having already alloted a large sum of money for the Ninth Malaysian Plan, any savings from such an important program is certainly welcomed. By paying the company a commission for the booking of any errant motorist will also ensure that the system is self-paying.

This system also relieve police personnel from doing this labour intensive job so that they can better be utilised to far more important assignment such as preventing and solving crime. This automated systems also can help to reduce corruption as the errant motorist are not booked and fined on the spot which creates a window of opportunity for corrupt practices.

Although this system is good, potential problems should be looked into. Will there be any double-booking - traffic infringements captured by the camera with the same offence summoned by a police personnel? Is there a way to prevent this from happening? And if this happened is the offence to be fined twice?

Because the camera system only capture the number plate of the offending car, who will take the rap for the offence? How to ensure that the fine is paid by the offending driver? This is important because the person who paid the fine may not be the person who committed the offence in the first place. And given that the demerit point systems had failed, what is there to prevent the abuse from happening?

In Malaysia there are numerous cases of fake number plates being used especially in the rural areas where checks are difficult. If such cars were to be caught, is there a way to trace such number plates? What happens if the rightful owner of the 'captured' number plate was summoned? Is there any appeal system for such cases?

What about change in address that was not reflected with the Road Transport Department (JPJ) database? How to ensure that such change in address is captured by the department?

The are many foreign cars using the Malaysian roads. Under the current system, foreign offenders are usually booked on the spot and they are to pay the summons at the nearest police stations or traffic police booth setup at designated shopping complex. Sometimes these foreigners crossed the border without paying the summones. Although the authority had said that they will check for any cars with outstanding summons at the checkpoint, this had not been the case. So with the camera systems, foreigners who flout the road rules will still be able to avoid paying for the summons. Until this is looked into, the system will seem very unfair to the locals.

Therefore although installing the cameras seemed a very good idea, the problem with the high accident rates on Malaysian roads is not one of lack of rules but one of lack of implementation. As long as poor implementation is not rectified, no matter how much technologies or manpower is utilised, the road offences will remains.

The West's irony

Categories: Wormie Says

If the world seemed to be against the US and the West maybe its because of the following possible reasons.

The West's attitudes towards the East and lslamic world had been one of being overbearing. The West tends to dictate to the other parts of the world in matters of governance, finance, industry and the environments. True, the West may have gone through the stage where the rest of the world is going through now. However, because of regional and cultural differences, their experiences may not be applicable locally. A perfect example would be the various shades of democracies in Asia and Africa. By being overbearing this creates resentment among the local populations.

There is some hypocracy when it comes to trade. The West talks about free trade. But it imposes tariffs on steel and clothes. It provides subsidies to its farmers. It imposes import quotas. It cites antidumping laws. But when dealing with Asian governments, it asks for removal of trade barriers, removal of quotas, and adjustments to foreign currencies exchange.

The US refuses to be a signatory to the Kyoto protocol. And yet it is the world's largest producer of greenhouse gases. It cited the exclusion of China and India as a reason for its refusal. As the self-appointed leader of the world, then lead by example. There shouldn't be any double standards.

The West worries about nuclear proliferations. It does not matter that they have nuclear weapons but other countries cannot do the same. While the West keeps mum about Israel's nuclear capability, there is even talks about a possible arms invasion against Iran's nuclear facilities.

The US frowns upon detention without trials that occurs in some Asian countries but it has held prisoners in the Guatanamo Bay prison for the last 3 years and none of the prisoners had made any court appearances. Prisoners from the Western world are repartriated but those from the Arab world were not. Never mind, if these Arab governments are allies.

The West cited freedom of expressions when a Danish daily published a cartoon depicting Prophet Mohammad. Never mind this is prohibited in Islam. Yet David Irving, a British historian, was jailed because he denied the existance of the Holocaust. It seems that there are laws that prevent anyone from ever denying that the Holocaust ever happened.

The US is quick to refer soldiers to the War Crime Tribunals, yet it is not a signatory of the Tribunal because American soldiers should only be tried by a US martial court.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the West was quick to condemned it as an act of aggression. The Afghans who defended their country were called resistance fighters. Some 20 years later, when the West invaded Iraq, it is called a war of liberation. The Iraqis who defended their country are called insurgents.

The West detested the eating of dogs in China and South Korea and yet beef is a staple in Western society. Never mind, that cow is considered sacred in India and not to be killed.

I am sure there are more examples of the double standards as practised by the West. Little wonder South Americans are voting in leftist govemments (to the West but rightist to the locals) in Columbia, Ecuador and Peru. I suspect it was for the same reasons that Hamas won in the Palestinian elections.

Even a rabbit will bite when it is cornered.